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I. Introduction 
 
“How wonderful that we have met with a paradox. 
Now we have some hope of making progress.” 
Niels Bohr 
 
a) Subject 
 
The inability of non-resident taxpayers without a PE1 in the source 
State 2  to deduct expenses may give rise to a charge that exceeds a 
reasonable taxation on a profit margin, if not the margin itself. Such 
assessment of tax on a gross basis (hereinafter referred to simply as “gross 
taxation”) may be alleviated for certain categories of income, subject to 
reduced tax rates under the domestic law of source countries. Nonetheless, 
gross taxation with reduced rates often entails a significantly higher tax 
liability than that arising from net taxation with standard rates 
(“paradoxically, taxation where a permanent establishment does not exist might be 
far more burdensome than if one did”3). Above all, “This form of taxation is… 
inefficient, as it does not take into account the different cost structures of individual 
taxpayers and often over-taxes some revenues and under-taxes others”4. Gross 
taxation may impact cross-border transactions to the point of dissuasion.  
The core of the existing international tax framework, modelled by the 
interaction of DTCs (the vast majority of which is based on the OECD 
Model) is the mitigation of double taxation. This dissertation endeavours 
to assess how the mechanisms for preventing double taxation address gross 
taxation, with a particular focus on the credit method. The OECD Model 
and the Commentary are the starting point of the analysis, followed by a 
concise examination of sample legislation and jurisprudence in selected 
countries. Finally, some potential solutions are briefly examined. 
                                                 
1 This analysis focuses solely on non-residents which have no PE in the source State to which the relevant 
income may be attributed.  
2  “Source State” means hereinafter the State to “which… primary taxation of an item of income is 
allocated” (Vogel (2005), p. 420). 
3 OECD (1983), §18/iv. 
4 OECD (2004a), §259. 
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b) Scope 
 
The subject of this dissertation involves a wide range of issues and 
leads which, if followed, would require far more than the words available. 
It is thus essential to clarify its scope. 
The issues analysed in respect of the OECD Model might also be 
examined with regard to other convention models, such as the UN and the 
US Models. Since the mechanisms employed to mitigate juridical double 
taxation are the same and gross taxation is more “tolerated” in the UN 
Model5, the conclusions of this dissertation should apply to the US Model, 
and a fortiori to the UN Model, and DTCs based thereupon. 
In a DTC context, one may debate gross taxation as a matter of tax 
policy, but not reasonably challenge its application on the basis of the 
current international tax framework. EU law is here disregarded because 
the crux of the analysis would be shifted from how the methods for the 
prevention of double taxation deal with gross taxation to ascertaining to 
what extent the latter is even admissible6.  
The discussion of other international tax law issues (e.g., 
administrative matters related to the application of both gross taxation and 
the methods for preventing double taxation, specific issues associated with 
income derived by artistes and sportsmen, topics relating to the protection 
of taxpayers, among many others) might complement this work. However, 
instead of perfunctory remarks that would do no justice to their relevance, 
the author opted for leaving them aside entirely. The main challenge in 
encapsulating such a fascinating subject in 15,000 words was drawing the 
thin line between pertinent and crucial.  
 
                                                 
5 An example is the ability of source countries levying tax on the gross amount of royalties, under Article 
12. 
6 The now called Court of Justice addressed this issue with respect to professional and business income in 
C-234/01 Gerritse, C-290/04 Scorpio, C-345/04 Centro Equestre and C-346/04 Conijn, and interest 
income in C-282/07 Truck Center and C-105/08 Commission v. Portugal. Gross taxation has also been 
criticised by reference to dividends (see Aramini (2008), p. 476). 
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II. Context of gross taxation at source 
 
a) The work leading to the OECD Model7 
 
Gross taxation was an ordinary phenomenon for those involved in 
the work commenced in 1921 by the League of Nations and revived in 
1956 by the Fiscal Committee and its Working Parties. Actually, gross 
taxation was explicitly acknowledged in some DTCs: “direct taxes are 
deemed to be taxes levied directly… on income (net or gross income) or on capital or 
increase to capital…”8. 
This does not mean the adverse consequences of gross taxation were 
unknown. A note prepared for Working Party no. 8 by the Belgian 
Delegation in October 1958 stressed that “a moderate tax computed on the 
gross amount of the royalties… would be to disregard a traditional principle in 
income taxation, namely, that the tax should fall on the net income less expenses. 
Taxing of the gross income at the source leads to injustices…”. In the 20th and 21st 
sessions of the Fiscal Committee, one of the UK delegates reported the 
impression that “a tax of 5 per cent on gross income in fact represented a tax of 25 
to 30 per cent on the net income” of film rents. He further argued that, if these 
were to be included in the royalties article, “the word ‘income’ in paragraph 4 
should be replaced by the word ‘payments’ ”. 
A possible explanation why gross taxation was “tolerated” may be 
that the purpose of the project was to allocate taxing rights between 
countries, a Herculean task in itself9.  Trying additionally to set rules on 
how such taxing rights would be exercised would have proved utopian10.  
This is illustrated in the minutes of the 17th session of the Fiscal 
Committee. One of the delegates for the US “observed that bodies granting 
loans more often than not required the interest to be clear of tax, which added to the 
                                                 
7 DTCs, working papers, reports and minutes referred to in this section were accessed between 9th and 11th 
April 2010 at http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/. 
8 Article 1(1) of the Germany–Switzerland DTC of 15th July 1931. 
9 The Report on the Taxation of Interest of Working Party no. 11 (14th January 1959) alluded to “different, 
not to say conflicting, proposals as to the taxation of interest”, for instance. 
10 Justifying the absence of computational rules from the scope of DTCs (from a PE and business profits 
perspective), see Arnold (2007), passim. 
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borrower's burden where there was a tax at the source on the interest”. In other 
words, lenders would impose gross-up clauses shifting the tax cost to the 
borrowers. Additionally, “He pointed out that the interest did not constitute a 
net income to the lender”. The OECD Model still reflects today the 
compromise arising from the ensuing discussion, with delegates “in favour 
of exclusive taxation in the country of the creditor's residence” and others 
demanding for the source country the highest tax rate possible (“not less 
than 15 per cent”). An agreement was eventually reached (“limiting the tax 
levied by the country of source to 10 per cent”), with Working Party no. 11 
“mindful that truth is as remote from extremes as is virtue” 11. 
 
b) The OECD Model today 
 
The possibility of gross taxation at source is therefore clear for 
dividends and interest (as well as royalties, in the UN Model and in many 
DTCs, even if based on the OECD Model). With the exceptions of (i) 
income which the source State may not tax and (ii) business profits of a PE 
due to Article 24(3), the source State is bound by no provision of the 
OECD Model in taxing other categories of income. Therefore, they are 
classified by the Commentary as “income… that may be taxed without any 
limitation in the State of source” (Introduction, §21).  
Theoretically, an argument might be made that gross taxation of non- 
-residents is intrinsically discriminatory vis-à-vis resident taxpayers. 
However, nationals of different Contracting States are only in a 
comparable position when resident in the same Contracting State, as 
clarified in 1997 by the introduction in Article 24 OECD Model of the 
expression “in particular with respect to residence”12. Therefore, even where 
personal circumstances appear to have little bearing upon a taxable event – 
e.g., rental income 13  –, the distinction between residents and non- 
                                                 
11  First Report (14th January 1959). The position of countries changed through times (e.g., the US 
defended source taxation in the early 1920s (see Kemmeren, Eric (2006), p. 436, fn. 61)).  
12 See Baker (2009), 24B.11, and the Commentary on Article 24 (§7). 
13 Neither Baker (2009), 6B.01 ff. (implicitly), nor Vogel (1999), p. 375, consider that the source State is 
restricted as regards the determination of income. Both the latter and Holmes (2007) p. 284, appear to 
assume that in practice some deductions will apply. However, none claims that such deductibility is 
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-residents14 may suffice to argue they are not in a comparable position15. 
Hence, it is not discriminatory for the source State to tax the net income of 
its residents and the gross income of the non-residents16, or to restrict the 
deductibility of certain expenses of the latter. 
The above does not mean the OECD is pleased with the state of 
affairs, particularly regarding interest derived by financial institutions. 
Specifically, “taxation by the State of source is typically levied on the gross 
amount of the interest and therefore ignores the real amount of income derived from 
the transaction for which the interest is paid”. This is because “a bank generally 
finances the loan which it grants with funds lent to it and, in particular, funds 
accepted on deposit” (Commentary on Article 11, §7.7). In light of the 
Vienna Convention17, it is at least unsatisfactory that the interpretation of 
one of the key concepts of a DTC (income) leads to its object (allocation of 
income taxing rights) becoming distorted (if gross taxation “ignores the real 
amount of income”, income tax becomes closer to a turnover tax). 
Furthermore, the Commentary recognises that “the amount of [source] 
tax may prevent the transaction from occurring unless… [it] is borne by the debtor” 
(idem), acknowledging that only gross-up clauses (laden with significant 
secondary effects and even forbidden in some countries18) can remove this 
obstacle to international trade and investment19.  
 
c) The position of countries 
 
Although a thorough discussion of the justifications for gross taxation 
at source falls outside the scope of this dissertation, some brief remarks 
may assist in illustrating the limitations of the international tax framework 
in addressing it.  
                                                                                                                                               
imposed by Article 6. The source State’s “domestic rules determine how the income should be computed 
or taxed” (Rohatgi (2005), p. 136).  
14 However, the inability to enforce against non-residents, which represented a fundamental difference 
vis-à-vis residents, is disappearing (see Baker (2002)). 
15 See Vogel (1999), pp. 1292-1293, on the application of this reasoning to non-individuals.  
16 See OECD (2007), §23. 
17 On the application of the Vienna Convention to the interpretation of DTCs see, among others, Baker 
(2009), E.02 ff., Vogel (1999), pp. 35 ff., and Rohatgi (2005), pp. 38 ff. 
18 See Vogel (1999), p. 721. 
19 On the impact of withholding taxes on gross income on cross-border flows, see Egger et alia (2006).  
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Gross taxation is simpler for both taxpayers and tax authorities, as it 
provides certainty on the taxable income20. Tax authorities also benefit 
from more straightforward tax audit procedures, since the “source country 
does not generally have access to all the information necessary to calculate tax 
correctly on a net basis”21. It is true that the progress of tax cooperation22 and 
the evolution of information technology have changed the international 
tax landscape, allowing tax authorities to increasingly access data on non- 
-resident taxpayers in a relatively timely and efficient manner 23 . 
Nonetheless, particularly when coupled with withholding tax mechanisms, 
gross taxation alleviates compliance costs for taxpayers and collection 
efforts for the tax authorities24. In the UK, those authorities have described 
(gross) taxation at source as “the great buttress of Income Tax stability and 
efficiency”25. The relevance of “practicality” for some literature has been 
stressed to the point of being claimed that “The concept [of PE] was invented 
to enable gross-basis taxation or tax exemption in case the local activities of non- 
-residents are not significant enough to justify the chore of identifying the net 
income”26. 
Another justification for gross taxation is the prevention of domestic 
tax base erosion. Unless non-residents are taxable in the source State on 
the full amount they charge to local taxpayers (which in principle the latter 
deduct for purposes of computing their taxable income), there is effective 
tax base erosion (e.g., local taxpayers deduct 100 whereas non-residents 
are taxed on 20). This erosion is the more significant the less local costs the 
non-resident taxpayer incurs, as is the case, for instance, of passive 
income27, where the connection of the non-resident with the source State 
                                                 
20 See Ault/Sasseville (2010), p. 105. 
21 Rixen (2008), p. 70. See also Ault/Sasseville (2010), p. 115. 
22 Involving both DTCs and specific exchange of information agreements, notably those driven by the 
OECD co-ordinated efforts against uncooperative jurisdictions. Some studies have concluded that 
information exchange may be more efficient than withholding taxes (Keen/Ligthart (2004) and 
Keen/Ligthart (2005)). The OECD has also been active in managing compliance risks (see OECD 
(2004b), passim). 
23 An example of such impact with respect to transfer pricing is provided by Jacobs et alia (2004). 
24 See Holmes (2007), p. 214. 
25 See Soos (1995), p. 50. 
26 Lee (2004), p. 43. 
27 Passive income is employed in the broad sense of income derived from passive activities (i.e., without 
an involvement “in the operation of the activity on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis”, as 
defined by the IRS in its “Tax Topics” – http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc425.html, accessed on 13th March 
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may be more superficial, hence less prone to giving rise to local costs 
(which might “restore” some of the local tax base)28.  
Finally, gross taxation, particularly through withholding29, is also a 
blunt but nonetheless robust instrument against tax avoidance, since the 
conduct of the taxpayer in respect of costs is irrelevant, significantly 
reducing the scope for “illegitimate planning” and straightforward abuse. 
Irrespective of the reasons, gross taxation, particularly when 
combined with withholding tax, does not appear to recede and in several 
jurisdictions its scope is actually expanded by exacting tax authorities, 
sometimes supported by courts30. 
 
d) The impact on taxpayers 
 
At least within the OECD, gross taxation at source is unilaterally 
alleviated by mitigated domestic rates31, further reduced by DTCs in many 
instances. However, it is highly unlikely that “withholding tax rates on gross 
income are sufficiently below the annual income tax rates on net income to more or 
less produce the same amount of tax collected”32 from taxpayers individually 
considered, particularly those operating with low net margins, often the 
case in high-volume activities such as bank lending.  
In the last 25 years, the average net interest margin (i.e., disregarding 
overheads and other expenses) of US banks ranged between 3% and 5%33. 
                                                                                                                                               
2010). However, the distinction between passive and active income is increasingly blurred (see OECD 
(2004a), §59, and Vogel (2002b), pp. 260 ff). 
28 An “unjustified” erosion would be unlikely in a transparent market with effective transfer pricing rules. 
Considering the example of cross-border loans and that it is more practical to deal with local 
counterparties, in principle funds would only be borrowed abroad if (i) domestic funds were insufficient 
(if available locally but externally refunded, the erosion would also occur, but at the level of a different 
taxpayer) or (ii) available in less attractive conditions. Since it is almost impossible to achieve so perfect a 
market, such erosion is documented, e.g., in Jarass/Obermair (2008). 
29 See Rixen (2008), p. 203. The withholding itself ensures “the collection of tax owed on income for 
which there is a high possibility of not being reported” (Akamatsu (2007), p. 413). Defending a 
coordinated withholding tax to prevent tax evasion, see Avi-Yonah (2007), p. 136, and Avi-Yonah (2008). 
30 For the example of India’s encompassing approach to withholding taxes, see Lowell et alia (2005). 
31 As compared to CIT rates applicable to net income. There are, of course, exceptions (e.g., Sweden, 
with a 28% CIT rate and a 30% withholding rate on dividends).  
32  Holmes (2007), p. 217. This is why, in gross taxation scenarios (and not simply differences in 
deductibility of certain expenditure) the “protection [of a residence State adopting the full credit method] 
against excessive levels of tax on the foreign measure of income” (Baker (1998), p. 454) is more 
theoretical than real. 
33 See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USNIM (accessed on 15th August 2010). 
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According to the IMF, between 2003 and 2008 the average net interest 
margin in the most representative European economies was even lower 
(0.9%-1.5%)34. However, assuming an interest rate of 10%, a bank subject 
to CIT rates of 25%, 30% and 35%35 on a net basis would only pay the 
same tax as a non-resident bank subject to gross taxation at reduced rates 
of 5%, 10% and 15% (the most common in DTCs) 36 if it achieved a net 
interest margin between 1.43% and 6%37.  
 
Domestic CIT 
rates
Non-resident      
reduced rates
"Required" net 
interest margin Tax due
5% 2,00% 5
10% 4,00% 10
15% 6,00% 15
5% 1,67% 5
10% 3,33% 10
15% 5,00% 15
5% 1,43% 5
10% 2,86% 10
15% 4,29% 15
30%
35%
25%
 
 
The comparison of the impact between net and gross taxation, even 
with a CIT rate above the average and disregarding all other expenses, 
illustrates how cross-border lending is hampered by gross taxation: 
 
"Realistic" net 
interest margin
Domestic         
CIT rate
Non-resident      
reduced rates
Tax due          
on net basis
Tax due          
on gross basis
5% 3 5
10% 3 10
15% 3 15
5% 9 5
10% 9 10
15% 9 15
5% 15 5
10% 15 10
15% 15 15
30%
1,00%
3,00%
5,00%
                                                 
34 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/statappx.pdf (accessed on 15th August 2010). 
35 In 2006, 22 of the 30 OECD countries had CIT rates ranging between 25% and 35% (Avi-Yonah 
(2007), p. 135). In 2009, the average was 26.4%, the lowest and the highest being Ireland (12.5%) and 
Japan (43%), respectively (Zielke (2010), p. 91). 
36 For a similar exercise with analogous conclusions on artistes (comparison between gross taxation at 
source and the average progressive taxation in the residence State), see Molenaar (2002), pp. 150-152. 
See also Molenaar (2006), especially pp. 179 and 192, and the CFE Statement, p. 5 (although from a EU 
perspective, the comments are fully applicable).  
37 If overheads and other expenses were considered, the margin would have to be even higher. 
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III. The response of the OECD Model to gross taxation at source  
 
a) The work leading to the OECD Model38  
 
In the Experts Report, under Article 3 (Relief through deductions and 
refunds) the residence State would be required to “deduct from its tax on the 
total income the lesser of the two following amounts: (a) The tax imposed by the 
other Contracting State on income taxable by priority therein; or (b) An amount 
which represents the same proportion of the tax payable on the total income as the 
income taxable by priority bears to the total income”. In the 1946 London Draft, 
Article XIII provided a more refined formulation to the second element of 
the equation: “The amount which represents the same proportion of the tax of the 
State of fiscal domicile on the entire net income of the taxpayer as the net income 
taxable in the other State bears of the entire net income”. If the interpretation of 
the Experts Report might be debatable – “the income taxable by priority” 
might be understood as gross income, as computed by the source country –, 
in the London Draft there appears to be a clear indication that the income 
taxable in the source State must be taken into consideration for this 
purpose as net of expenses.  
It is worth mentioning that when this work was picked up by the 
OECD, some DTCs had in the meantime adopted a different approach. In 
the Sweden-Norway DTC of 21st June 1947, Article 7 allowed the source 
State to withhold 10 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends. 
However, it also provided that “the other State shall allow, from its national 
income tax levied on the dividends, a special deduction in respect of the tax deducted 
at the source in the first State, which deduction shall amount to not less than 5 per 
cent of the gross amount of the dividends”. An equivalent method, with the 
same rates, appeared in Article 8 of the France-Norway DTC of 22nd 
September 1953. 
Unfortunately, although gross taxation at source was known to “lead 
to injustices”, the need to find a compromise was propitious to either 
                                                 
38 Brief remarks on earlier appearances of double tax relief methods are found in Avery Jones et alia 
(2006), p. 253. 
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disregarding or accepting its consequences. Therefore, none of the versions 
of the Report on Methods for Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income, 
prepared by Working Party no. 15, makes a single reference to gross 
taxation. It is possible that at the time its members (Denmark and Ireland) 
were not those countries whose taxpayers were more exposed to its 
detrimental impact (whereas in the US and the UK, as illustrated above, 
there was a clear perception of its implications on interest and royalties). 
In its Preliminary version (24th February 1959), the Report noted that “The 
limited rate of tax in the state of source will as a rule be substantially less than the 
rate of tax in the State of residence”. The focus was clearly the rate of tax; how 
taxable income was computed was apparently ignored. Therefore, the 
Preliminary Report stated that “It is not the function of a Convention to provide 
relief in one State from the effects of a higher level of taxation in the other[;]… for 
the avoidance of double taxation it should be sufficient if the lower of the two taxes 
were given up”. The Final Report (9th September 1960) would not change 
this perception.  
 
b) The OECD Model today 
 
i) Introduction: justification for focus on the credit method  
 
Since the OECD Model does not specifically address gross 
taxation, indirect relief, if any, has to be sought in provisions dealing 
with double taxation. Although the OECD Model offers two 
alternative methods for mitigating or eliminating double taxation, the 
following analysis will focus on the credit method for three reasons.  
First, both Articles 23-A and 23-B of the OECD Model endorse 
the credit method for dividends and interest income, precisely the two 
types of income where gross taxation at source is explicitly vouched 
for by the OECD Model. 
Additionally, and considering a single item of income, it is the 
only method with the ability to relieve gross taxation at source, in the 
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event that the net taxation in the residence State exceeds the gross 
taxation in the source State.  
Finally, in the opposite situation, “if the tax burden in the state of 
source is higher [quite often the case of gross taxation39], then the credit 
method works in the same way as the exemption method”40. This means 
that similar conclusions can be drawn for both methods when gross 
taxation is at issue.  
 
ii) Limit on the foreign tax credit  
 
When analysing how the OECD Model addresses gross 
taxation at source, all issues relevant for the elimination or mitigation 
of double taxation in general, such as conflicts of qualification, 
conflicts of interpretation, timing of the relief, relevance of source41, 
and compliance and formalities, to name a few, are naturally 
pertinent. However, the specific and therefore main concern as 
regards gross taxation is how the amount of the relief provided by the 
residence State is computed. It is therefore essential to ascertain what 
guidance, if any, the OECD Model provides in this respect. 
Disregarding references to taxes on capital, the language 
establishing the threshold of the amount of credit to be granted by the 
residence State in respect of tax levied on income in the source State 
is almost identical in both provisions. Ignoring minor differences of 
style, the common denominator is the following: “Such deduction […] 
shall not, however, exceed that part of the […] tax, as computed before the 
deduction is given, which is attributable […] to such items of income derived 
from that other State / to the income which may be taxed in that other State”. 
The difference between “items of income derived from” and “income 
which may be taxed in” is not particularly relevant since both refer to 
“items of income which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10 and 
                                                 
39 See Baker (2009), 23.B10, footnote 3.  
40 Baker (2009), 23B.01. See also the Commentary on Article 23B, §62. 
41 See Avery Jones et alia (1998), pp. 239 ff. 
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11, may be taxed in the other Contracting State”. The threshold in both 
provisions can thus be summarised as: 
the part of the residence State tax (computed before deducting the credit) 
attributable to income which may be taxed in the source State. 
 
1. Which measure of taxable income applies 
 
With the exception of timing issues42, the tax charge in the 
source State is in principle known and certain when the limit on 
foreign tax credit is computed in the residence State. No such 
degree of certainty applies to the “part of the residence State 
tax” which is attributable to the income which may be taxed in 
the source State. More precisely, “the issue is whether in computing 
the limit on foreign tax credit one uses the foreign, source country’s 
measure of taxable income”43  or that of the residence State. In 
other words, the latter has to decide whether “it is going to 
recognise tax paid on amounts that would not be included in calculating 
income under its own rules such as where the other country levies a final 
withholding tax on gross payments”44. 
If the source State’s measure of taxable income is used, in 
principle only a lower tax rate in the residence State may limit 
the foreign tax credit and at any rate capital export neutrality is 
achieved. Conversely, if the residence State’s measure of taxable 
income prevails, differences in its computation may become the 
major hurdle to the elimination of income tax obstacles to cross- 
-border transactions. Although double taxation may be relieved 
– if the credit granted prevents the residence State from 
collecting any tax on the relevant income – gross taxation will 
remain unaffected, potentially exceeding the profit of the 
transaction. 
                                                 
42  E.g., relating to the date on which the tax liability is assessed in the two States, or subsequent 
adjustments to the tax liability following a tax audit. See Commentary on Articles 23-A and 23-B, §61. 
43 Baker (1998), p. 446. 
44 Harris (1999), p. 481. 
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Since gross taxation was not a primary focus of the OECD 
Model, it is not surprising that it is has no clear stance on which 
measure of taxable income should be adopted for this purpose. 
At least theoretically, the combination of the expressions “part of 
the tax… which is attributable” and “income which may be taxed” 
might lead to opposing views.  
Both the Commentary and international literature 
consensually maintain that the adoption of the ordinary credit, 
instead of a full credit45, implies that the measure of taxable 
income of the residence State prevails46. Otherwise, in the event 
the taxpayer derived both foreign and domestic income, the 
residence States would relinquish some tax on purely domestic 
income to accommodate a foreign tax credit in excess of their 
own tax claim “attributable” to the foreign income.  
This conclusion is disputable.  One may argue that 
limiting the credit to the part of the tax which is attributable to 
the income taxable in the source State establishes a causal 
connection, but not necessarily a quantitative correlation. 
Literally, the “income which may be taxed” in the source State is 
its gross amount, which means one might read that the source 
State’s measure of taxable income should prevail. 
However, the “part of the [residence State’s] tax” which is 
attributable to such income does not appear to be a theoretical 
amount. Instead, it represents the concrete tax charge that 
would be due considering the taxable event in its entirety (i.e., 
both the income and the deductible expenses incurred to 
generate it). The Commentary on Articles 23-A and 23-B (§62) 
clarifies the matter by stating that the residence State is not 
required to give credit for more than the portion of its tax 
                                                 
45 See Commentary on Articles 23-A and 23-B, §§16 and 23 ff. 
46 See Commentary on Articles 23-A and 23-B, §§29 and 63, Baker (2009), 23B10, Holmes (2007), 
p. 104 (noting that “inequities arise… because the ordinary tax credit… is typically based on net 
income”), Rohatgi (2005), p. 285, and Vogel (1999), also referring to the critical appraisal by some other 
authors (pp. 1228 and 1229). Baker (1998) also notes that the Commentary does not specifically address 
scenarios of gross taxation at source (p. 453). 
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effectively due on the income for which the credit is granted. 
The Commentary accepts that such income is computed on a 
net basis.  
 
2. How to apply the measure of taxable income  
 
Several alternatives of application by the residence State of 
its measure of taxable income are admissible. As an example, 
there can be a separate computation of the threshold for each 
item of income but also a calculation of the proportion of the 
foreign income in the total income, followed by the 
multiplication of tax due in the residence State by the resulting 
ratio47. In addition, the above computation can refer to a single 
item of income or to a combination (per country and/or per 
category, among other possibilities)48. 
Although these alternatives may give rise to different 
results and thus greatly impact the position of both taxpayer and 
residence State, the OECD Model refrains from imposing 
solutions. According to the Commentary on Articles 23-A and 
23-B, the decision was to “leave each State free to apply its own 
legislation and technique” (§62), “[i]n view of the wide variety of fiscal 
policies and techniques in the different States regarding the 
determination of tax” (§42). This means that States are given 
generous leeway, provided the basic principle of double taxation 
relief is observed. However, the practical application of the 
principle gives rise to numerous problems (e.g., ascertaining 
where the income is deemed to arise from, allocating expenses 
between domestic and foreign income, etc.). Consequently, the 
view that “The aforementioned problems depend very much on 
domestic laws and practice, and the solution must, therefore, be left to 
each State” (§66; see also §32) is extremely unhelpful. 
                                                 
47 The latter assumes the same profit margin for income of all categories and origins. See Commentary on 
Articles 23-A and 23-B, §62. 
48 See Commentary on Articles 23-A and 23-B, §64. 
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Since the relevant concepts of the provision in question (such as 
“attributable” or “income which may be taxed”) are not defined, the 
position of the Commentary in deferring both issues to the domestic 
laws of residence States may be justifiable in light of Article 3(2). On 
the other hand, one may also consider remarkable that the OECD 
Model accepts such reliance on domestic law, considering the impact 
of such solution on the elimination of double taxation. The Vienna 
Convention requires that treaties be “interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose” (Article 31(1)). It has 
been stated that the context has an additional weight when the tax 
base is in question, since “interpretation by recourse to the domestic tax 
law… is particularly apt to lead to inappropriate results”49. One may thus 
ask whether the OECD Model should not provide a “«treaty» meaning 
of the term[s]”50 in question. A uniform solution for computing the 
foreign tax credit would at least mitigate the detrimental impact of the 
“conceptual misalignment” 51  between gross taxation at source and 
computation of the foreign tax credit on a net basis. Such 
misalignment arises from a “dislocation between tax law and its subject 
matter” 52 , which the OECD Model accepts by tolerating gross 
taxation. 
Notwithstanding the above, refraining from dictating how the 
foreign tax credit method applies in practice is a coherent 
consequence of the role and rationale of the OECD Model. The work 
leading to it focused primarily on the differences between tax rates. 
Hence, capping the foreign tax credit pursuant to an objective 
comparison of tax charges befits the purpose of the OECD Model: 
allocating taxing rights, not ruling (extensively) on how they are 
exercised.  
                                                 
49 Vogel (1999), p. 215. 
50 Baker (2009), E.20. 
51 Holmes (2007), p. 218.  
52 Holmes (2001), p. 238. 
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IV. The response of residence States to gross taxation at source 
 
a) Introduction  
 
According to the OECD Model, the most significant aspects related 
to the computation of the foreign tax credit fall within the purview of each 
country. It is therefore necessary to enquire how countries (i) avail of the 
ample margin of liberty conferred by the OECD Model or (ii) grant 
unilateral credit in the absence of a DTC, since “preventing double taxation 
through a credit or exemption has become part of customary international law”53. 
Additionally, Articles 23-A and 23-B are “altered, supplemented or even 
replaced wholesale in most bilateral conventions”54 to accommodate specificities 
of domestic law. 
Selecting countries as examples in an international tax law context 
entails a degree of subjectivity. In this case, the choice is justified as 
follows. First, an overview of a considerable group (eleven) of OECD 
countries provides a perspective of what one may describe as a common 
practice within the organisation. Secondly, three non-OECD countries are 
also examined in order to try to ascertain whether the practice of the first 
group is somehow specific to the OECD or denotes a universal trend.   
 
b) Which measure of taxable income applies 
 
i) Examples in legislation of OECD countries 
 
Irrespective of minor technical or language differences, all the 
eleven OECD countries examined adopt their own measure of 
taxable income for foreign tax credit purposes (irrespective of the 
relief being treaty-based or unilateral). Since not a single one of the 
eleven countries examined was found to dissent, one may venture to 
assume that they reflect the position in the majority, if not entirety, of 
                                                 
53 Avi-Yonah (2007), p. 133.  
54 Couzin (2002), p. 267. 
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the OECD countries in this regard. This may mean that taxpayers 
resident in economies which represent approximately 50% of the 
world’s gross domestic product55 are unable to secure relief against 
gross taxation abroad56:  
 
− Belgium: under the Income Taxes Code (Code des impôts sur les 
revenues), the foreign tax credit (“Quotité forfaitaire d'impôt 
étranger” – Article 285(1)) that may be deducted from the 
Belgian tax payable is ordinarily capped at fifteen eighty-fifths of 
the net income (“quinze quatre-vingt cinquièmes du revenu net” – 
Article 286(1)). The amount of the denominator is one hundred, 
in case the debtor of the income bears the tax levied by the 
source State on behalf of the Belgian beneficiary of the income 
(Article 286(4)), which in practice prevents the latter from 
deriving an additional benefit from gross-up clauses. With 
respect to interest income, the limit on the foreign tax credit 
results from a formula which, in very broad terms, takes into 
consideration the tax effectively suffered abroad, up to a 
maximum of 15 percent, and the proportion the financial 
expenses proportionally imputable to the foreign source interest 
(Article 287(1)(b))57; 
 
− France: according to §§19 and 20 of the Statement of Practice 
no. 14B-1-76, of 1st April 1976 (Bulletin Officiel de la Direction 
Générale des Impôts no. 68, 6th April 1976), the foreign tax credit 
cannot exceed the part of tax that corresponds to the income to 
which such credit is attached. For such purpose taxable income 
is computed as the gross income deducted of all expenses 
incurred in order to obtain and preserve income, except for the 
tax suffered abroad (“est égal au montant brut des revenus diminué 
                                                 
55 See http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,3343,en_2649_33959_45467980_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
56 All non-English excerpts below were unofficially translated by the author. 
57 See also Schoonvliet (2008), p. 433. 
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de toutes les dépenses effectuées en vue de l'acquisition et de la 
conservation des revenus, à l'exception de l'impôt prélevé à l'étranger”); 
 
− Germany: Article 34c(1) ITL, (Einkommensteuergesetz) also 
applicable to companies by virtue of a cross-reference from the 
CIT Law, states that foreign tax credit is assessed by reference to 
items of foreign income net of business expenses and negative 
variations in worth that have an economic connection with the 
gross revenue underlying such net income (“Betriebsausgaben und 
Betriebsvermögensminderungen abzuziehen, die mit den diesen 
Einkünften zugrunde liegenden Einnahmen in wirtschaftlichem 
Zusammenhang stehen”);  
 
− Italy: the former rule (Article 15 ITC) did not clarify whether 
foreign income should be computed on a gross or net basis for 
these purposes58. The current rule, Article 165(1), sets the cap as 
the part of the Italian CIT due which corresponds to the 
proportion of the foreign income in the total income, deducted 
of tax losses carried forward (“quota d'imposta  corrispondente  al 
rapporto tra i redditi prodotti all'estero ed il reddito complessivo 
dichiarato al netto delle perdite di precedenti periodi d'imposta”). 
Furthermore, if the foreign income is only partially taxable, the 
foreign tax is also reduced accordingly (Article 165(10). Except 
for a few exceptions, such proportion is computed on a per 
country basis (Article 165(3))59. 
 
− Luxembourg: Articles 134ter and 109 (1)1.a of the Income Tax 
Law (Loi concernant l’impôt sur le revenue) clarify that the taxable 
income underlying the computation of the part of Luxembourg’s 
tax which serves as limit on foreign tax credit (“fraction d’impôt 
sur laquelle un impôt à étranger est à imputer”) is net of expenses 
                                                 
58 See Aramini/Franze (2002), p. 30. 
59  For more details on the Italian regime, see Aramini/Bochicchio (2004), Contrino (2007), and 
Stesuri/Grammatico (2004). 
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incurred to generate it. The relevant part of tax is computed by 
reference to the proportion of the foreign net income in the total 
net income (Article 134ter(4)); 
 
− Netherlands: Article 36(4) of the Law on the Prevention of 
Double Taxation (Besluit voorkoming dubbele belasting) also 
clarifies that the foreign tax credit is computed by reference to 
dividends and interest net of the related costs incurred (“worden 
dividenden en interest verminderd met de daarmee verband houdende 
kosten”), as is the case of the remaining categories of income 
under other paragraphs of the same Article; 
 
− Portugal: according to Article 91(1) of the CIT code (Código do 
Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Colectivas), the foreign tax 
credit is capped at the lower of the tax suffered in the source 
State and the Portuguese CIT, computed before the credit, due 
on the income that may be taxed in such State, net of expenses 
directly or indirectly incurred to generate it (“fracção do IRC, 
calculado antes da dedução, correspondente aos rendimentos que no país 
em causa possam ser tributados, líquidos dos gastos directa ou 
indirectamente suportados para a sua obtenção”); 
 
− Spain: Article 31(1)(b) of the Companies Tax Law (Ley del 
Impuesto de Sociedades) limits the foreign tax credit at the lower of 
(i) the tax borne abroad and (ii) the tax that would be due in 
Spain on the relevant income if derived within Spanish territory 
(“El importe de la cuota íntegra que en España correspondería pagar 
por las mencionadas rentas si se hubieran obtenido en territorio 
español”).  
 
− Sweden: pursuant to §10 of the Foreign Tax Credit Act (Lag 
1986:486 om avräkning av utländsk skatt), the  Swedish tax liability 
that serves as cap of the credit is also computed on the relevant 
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foreign income after deduction of related costs (“intäktsposter efter 
avdrag för kostnadsposter”); 
 
− UK: s42(3) TIOPA establishes that, for purposes of computing 
the credit provided under s18(2), income or gain is “reduced (or 
extinguished) by any amount allocated to it” in the form of a general 
deduction and other specific deductions listed therein. More 
specifically, in the case of trade income, one must “take into 
account (a) deductions which would be allowed in calculating the 
company’s liability, and (b) expenses of a company connected with the 
company, so far as reasonably attributable to the income” (s44(3)). 
Furthermore, s44(4) states that a “just and reasonable 
apportionment of deductions that relate (a) partly to the transaction, 
arrangement or asset from which the income arises, and (b) partly to 
other matters” should be considered.  
 
− US: s904(a) IRC establishes that “The total amount of the [foreign] 
credit… shall not exceed the same proportion of the tax against which 
such credit is taken which the taxpayer's taxable income from sources 
without the United States (but not in excess of the taxpayer's entire 
taxable income) bears to his entire taxable income for the same taxable 
year”. S63(a) states that “the term “taxable income” means gross 
income minus the deductions allowed…”60. Additionally, s904(d) 
contains restrictions for particular categories of income and 
provisions dealing with overheads and general costs that have to 
be allocated pro-rata to domestic and foreign income61.  
 
 
 
                                                 
60 See Vacovec et alia (2001), pp. 401-402. 
61 See also §§359-360 of the US Model Technical Explanation of 15th November 2006. There are various 
other limitations to the amount of foreign tax credit, some of which with a partial or indirect relationship 
with the issue of gross taxation at source. Although that was not the issue under analysis, an example is 
the rule addressed in Jamieson v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, US Tax Court docket no. 16421-05, 
(2009) 11 ITLR 40.  
 25
ii) Examples in case-law 
 
The law in some of these countries was not always as clear as 
currently is (at least apparently) and several interesting points have 
been discussed before the courts. 
 
1. The Yates case  
 
 In Yates v GCA62, among other issues the UK High Court 
(on appeal from a Special Commissioner decision) had to 
ascertain the meaning of the expression “income arising in” of 
s498(3) ICTA. This provision read “Credit for tax paid under the 
law of the territory outside the United Kingdom and computed by 
reference to income arising in that territory shall be allowed against any 
United Kingdom income tax or corporation tax computed by reference 
to that income…”. Specifically, the Court had to decide which 
law was relevant for determining whether income arose, or not, 
in the source State and it concluded, by a comparative analysis 
with an equivalent expression in s516(1) ICTA, that where 
income arose was to be determined by UK law63. Consequently, 
a portion of the income derived by GCA was deemed to have 
arisen within the UK and only the foreign tax attributable to the 
other portion could be credited against UK tax.  
 With regards to the computation of the taxable income 
proper, s505 ICTA provided that “The amount of the credit for 
foreign tax which, under any arrangements, is to be allowed against 
corporation tax in respect of any income shall not exceed the corporation 
tax attributable to that income”. Historically, in the UK income 
was measured in accordance with foreign rules, but the opposite 
position of the tax authorities, upholding that taxable income 
should be as computed under UK law, prevailed before the 
                                                 
62 1 STC 157. 
63 The Court also appealed to a second argument, which, however, was specific to that particular source 
country (Venezuela), not universal. See the criticism in Oliver (1993), p. 210. 
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Special Commissioner, despite some uncertainty as to the exact 
grounds underlying the result64. Since this particular point was 
not argued before the High Court, it was in fact decided by the 
Special Commissioner alone, with no confirmation from the 
High Court. Despite the “thin” authority justifying such 
relevant change, the Inland Revenue Manuals quickly embraced 
the change and a significant change of practice took effect65. 
 
2. The Legal & General Assurance case 
 
Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners 66  shows how conflicting interpretations can be 
sustained in respect of the same provision, despite its apparent 
simplicity 67 . Specifically, and among other issues which are 
irrelevant for this investigation, the Chancery Division had to 
decide precisely whether the measure of taxable income in the 
UK was gross or net for that particular item of income at stake. 
The UK tax authorities, appealing from a decision of the 
Special Commissioners, presented an excerpt of Article 24 of 
the UK-France DTC as an example of the standard form of the 
relevant foreign tax credit provision adopted by the UK in its 
DTCs. The provision read: “French tax payable under the laws of 
France and in accordance with this Convention, whether directly or by 
deduction, on profits, income or chargeable gains from sources within 
France … shall be allowed as a credit against any United Kingdom tax 
computed by reference to the same profits, income or chargeable gains by 
reference to which the French tax is computed ….”. The UK tax 
authorities submitted that this provision should be construed as 
requiring a calculation of the portion of the overall profit of the 
taxpayer that was attributable to the foreign income, because 
                                                 
64 See Oliver (1993), p. 215. 
65 See Baker (1998), pp. 446 and 450-452. 
66 [2006] STC 1763. 
67 Hannam (2008) states that “The judge felt that each party's interpretation of the double tax treaty could 
be supported” (p. 462). 
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that was the “relevant income” referred to in s797(1) ICTA. Thus, 
Legal & General (“L&G”) should be allowed credit only against 
so much of its UK tax liability as was attributable to its foreign 
income. Otherwise, the taxpayer would be “given credit against 
UK tax which is attributable, not to the relevant foreign income, but to 
other unrelated receipts… [an] anomaly… compounded by the fact that 
the smaller the amount of the UK tax which is attributable to the 
foreign income, the more widely the credit relief is spread to the 
unrelated receipts” (§30). 
Mr. Justice Evans-Lombe noted that Article 24 of the UK-
France treaty referred to “a credit against any [not “the”] United 
Kingdom tax computed by reference to the same profits, income or 
chargeable gains by reference to which the French tax is computed…”. 
Hence, such expression could be interpreted as simply 
“establishing that the foreign income or gain on which the foreign tax 
arose must enter into the computation of the UK tax against which 
credit for the foreign tax is claimed” (§32). Additionally, he also 
upheld L&G’s view that the wording of the DTC provision and 
of s790(4) was “a very circuitous and obscure way for a draftsman 
who intended to realise the result contended for by the Revenue, to 
choose to achieve that result” (§32). Finally, he noted that the 
position of the tax authorities accorded different meanings to 
the same expression (income or chargeable gain) in different 
sections (793 and 795(2)) and that the presence of s798 was 
more congruous with L&G’s position (§§39 and 40). 
Therefore, he concluded that the credit should be limited 
“only so that the foreign tax cannot exceed the UK tax which would 
have been chargeable on that income” (§42) but that “income” was 
not so defined under UK law as to impose a separate 
computation on a net basis for foreign income.  Hence, the limit 
on the foreign tax credit was not the UK tax liability on the 
particular item of foreign income in question, but the UK tax 
liability on its relevant worldwide income. 
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Interestingly, the Irish tax authorities quickly emphasised 
the absence of any impact of this decision in Ireland. They held 
in an article on Double Tax Relief that “The position in Ireland is 
fundamentally different and has been since the mid 1990s... the net 
basis is the only basis that was open in Ireland, and this continues to be 
the case subsequent to the Legal and General decision because of the 
construction of the Irish legislation”68. Furthermore, even before the 
decision was issued, the Finance Act 2005 introduced s798A(2), 
clarifying that “The reference in section 797(1) to the relevant income 
or gain shall be treated as referring only to income arising or gains 
accruing out of the transaction, arrangement or asset in connection with 
which the credit for foreign tax arises”69. This means that even in the 
UK this case-law will be of limited relevance in the future.  
Nonetheless, the L&G case raises interesting points, 
including the Court’s view that “Article 23B of the OECD Model 
Convention is an example of how the Revenue's result might have been 
achieved” (§32) 70 , implying that according to the Court such 
provision is clear in requiring the application of the residence 
State’s measure of taxable income. 
 
3. The Spanish case no. 00/4365/2004, of 15th February 200771 
 
A Spanish company rendering technical assistance and 
management services abroad challenged the position of the 
Spanish tax courts, which had started to progressively uphold 
that the cap of the foreign tax credit had to be computed on the 
net income, as calculated in accordance with Spanish tax law. 
In its allegations, the taxpayer noted that the computation of the 
threshold by reference to the net income “is not based on any 
explicit legal provision” (“no está basada en previsión legal expresa 
alguna”).  
                                                 
68 Accessed at http://www.revenue.ie/en/practitioner/tax-briefing/67/tb08.htm on 10th April 2010.  
69 s44(2) TIOPA maintains this rule. 
70 The UK tax authorities also acknowledged that the OECD Model language was clearer (§31). 
71 Accessed at http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/doctrinateac/detalle.asp on 13th March 2010. 
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The Court replied that the expression “income”, although 
not specifically defined for these purposes, relied on the concept 
of taxable event (“hecho imponible”), which in turn was clearly 
defined as resulting from the adjustment of the commercial 
profit and loss in accordance with tax rules. Therefore, there 
was abundant evidence supporting the view that “income” 
should be understood as the net income, i.e., deducting from the 
gross foreign revenue the expenses incurred for its generation 
(“el rendimiento neto obtenido por dicho concepto, es decir, deduciendo 
del ingreso procedente del extranjero los gastos necesarios para su 
obtención”).  
 
iii) Is the residence State’s measure of taxable income universal? 
 
In light of the above sample analysis of both legislation and 
case-law, it is appropriate to ask whether the residence State’s 
measure of taxable income has become universal. It is impossible to 
carry out such vast enterprise in this paper, but the fact that its 
application is not exclusive to the OECD can be exemplified with 
two non-OECD Member States.  
In Nigeria, s23(k) CITA exempts from tax dividends, interest, 
royalties and rental income derived abroad and brought into Nigeria 
through Government approved channels. However, the credit 
method applies to other types of income, e.g. profits of a PE or fees 
which have been liable for withholding tax in the source State. With 
respect to profits derived in Commonwealth countries, Nigeria 
preserves the old form of the “Commonwealth Tax Credit” once in force 
in the British Commonwealth. Specifically, s44(2) grants a credit of 
up to a certain percentage of the “rate of tax”72. S44(3) defines it as 
“the rate determined by dividing the amount of tax imposed (before the 
deduction of any double taxation relief granted by this Act) by the amount of 
total profits of the company for that year, and the Commonwealth rate of tax 
                                                 
72 The Commonwealth rate of tax if it does not exceed half the Nigerian rate of tax and half the Nigerian 
rate of tax in the opposite scenario. 
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shall be determined in a similar manner”73. Although this might in theory 
give rise to a dilution of the foreign income in the total profits of the 
company and thus affect the application of Nigerian measure of 
taxable income, under s44(1) the credit is limited to the product of 
such rate by “that part of its profits” that were subject to tax abroad. 
With respect to income derived outside the Commonwealth, s46(3) 
provides that “The credit shall not exceed the amount which would be 
produced by computing in accordance with the provisions of the Act the 
amount of the profits which are liable to both tax and foreign tax and then 
charging that amount to tax” at the appropriate rate. Therefore, in both 
cases the Nigerian rules for computing the taxable profit prevail. 
In South Africa, taxpayers deriving foreign income not deemed 
to be of South African source can avail of the domestic tax relief 
enshrined in s6quat ITA, be it in the absence of a DTC or instead of 
the relief provided by such DTC, if they so decide (s6quat(3)). 
According to s6quat(1B)(a), the foreign tax credit (designated as 
“rebate”) “shall not in aggregate exceed an amount which bears to the total 
normal tax payable the same ratio as the total taxable income attributable to 
the income, proportional amount, foreign dividend, taxable capital gain or 
amount, as the case may be, which is included as contemplated in subsection 
(1), bears to the total taxable income”. The expression “total taxable income 
attributable to the income” appears more precise than the one adopted 
by the OECD Model, since it clarifies the need for an intermediate 
step (re-computing the foreign item of income in question in 
accordance with South African rules), before ascertaining what the 
tax payable on the foreign income is. For good measure, 
Interpretation Note no. 18 (Issue 2), of 31st March 2009, of the South 
African Revenue Service clarifies that “In determining the taxable 
income derived from a foreign source: any expenditure incurred which is 
directly attributable to such income must be deducted from such income…; 
and a portion of any general expenses incurred which are not directly 
attributable to income derived either domestically or abroad, for example, 
                                                 
73 For profits arising in other countries, see s46(3), where the Nigerian measure of taxable income also 
prevails. 
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head office expenses, must be apportioned… based on any method which gives 
a fair and reasonable apportionment appropriate to the circumstances of the 
particular case (for example, turnover, gross profit or value of fixed assets)” 
(p. 23). South Africa’s tax base is thus protected: “The purpose of 
foreign tax credit relief is not to relieve all foreign taxation thereby subsidising 
the tax base of foreign jurisdictions, but rather to ensure that in providing relief 
to South African residents from double taxation, South Africa’s tax base is 
protected” (p. 22). Nevertheless, although the computation of the 
foreign income is made on an item by item basis, the rebate itself is 
computed on an overall basis, thus maximising the amount of credit 
available 74 . In addition, pursuant to Section 6quat(1B)(a)(iii) any 
excess can be carried forward for a period of up to seven years. 
Notwithstanding the apparent convergence of position between 
countries with so different tax regimes, the application of the 
residence State’s measure of taxable income is neither unanimous nor 
even clear in the law of some countries. Actually, in some countries 
the matter is, or at least was at some point, controversial. 
In Brazil, the combined interpretation of Articles 1, 14 and 15 
of the Governmental Ruling (Instrução Normativa) no. 213/02, of 7th 
October 2002, appears to indicate that taxpayers are granted a full 
credit for tax suffered abroad. Specifically, the limit of the foreign tax 
credit is set at 34% (25% of CIT, plus 9% of social contribution on net 
profit) of the gross income. The law states that the creditable amount 
of the tax paid abroad cannot exceed the positive difference between 
the tax calculated on the taxable profit with and without the inclusion 
of the profits, income and gains derived abroad75. Courts have not 
explicitly addressed the subject and usually decisions simply state the 
wording of the Governmental Ruling. In its decision (acórdão) of case 
no. 07-7074, of 2nd December 2005, for instance, the Federal Tax 
                                                 
74 Assuming that rules for computing the taxable income are broadly the same in South Africa and in a 
source country, the foreign tax suffered therein at a rate in excess of the South Africa CIT rate (currently 
28%) may still be creditable, as the relevant income may be added to other items of foreign income 
subject to lower rates.  
75  “[O] tributo pago no exterior … não poderá exceder… [a] diferença positiva entre os valores 
calculados sobre o lucro real com e sem a inclusão dos referidos lucros, rendimentos e ganhos de 
capital” (Article 14, §11). 
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Court of Florianópolis referred to the difference between the tax 
computed with the inclusion of the foreign income and the tax due 
without that same income, which is almost literally the language of 
the law76. 
The above raises the issue of how to interpret the concept of 
income in this respect. When the law refers simply to the income 
derived abroad, without any allusion to deductible expenses, the 
computation of the cap as the positive difference between the tax due 
with and without the inclusion of foreign income appears to take only 
into consideration its gross amount. This was precisely the kind of 
issue that was at stake in Portugal and Spain – two OECD Member- 
-States – for several years, due to the excessive simplicity of the 
relevant provisions. 
In Spain, it is not entirely clear in the wording of the law that 
the Spanish tax due on the foreign income that serves as threshold of 
the foreign tax credit implies the computation of such income in 
accordance with the general rules (including those on deductibility of 
expenses). Spanish courts have issued conflicting decisions and 
certain authors held that the cap would have to be computed on the 
gross amount77, thus allowing in practice the source State’s measure 
of taxable income to apply. However, the opposite view eventually 
prevailed in the jurisprudence, as exemplified above with case no. 
00/4365/200478. More recently, Courts have been confronted with 
(and not yet unanimously solved) the issue of whether a fraction of 
the general expenses of the company should be proportionally 
allocated to the relevant foreign income, but the fact that the cap is 
computed on the net income appears to be settled. 
In Portugal, the same conclusion was reached, not by a Court 
but by act of Parliament. The reference to the Portuguese CIT being 
computed on income net of expenses directly or indirectly incurred to 
                                                 
76 Very similar language was adopted by the Federal Tax Court of São Paulo in the case no. 17-9607, of 
12th November 2004.  All decisions accessed at http://decisoes.fazenda.gov.br on 27th and 28th April 2010. 
77 E.g., Zunzunegui/Viñas (2006). 
78 Another example is the decision of 15th March 2007 (case 00/1922/2004) of the Central Economic and 
Administrative Court. 
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generate it was only introduced by Law 39-A/2005, of 29th July 2005. 
Previously, the wording of the Portuguese law was almost a literal 
translation of the OECD Model formulation: the cap was simply the 
Portuguese CIT liability, computed before the credit, corresponding 
to the income that might be taxed in the source State. Therefore, 
there was some margin for construing the limit of the foreign tax 
credit as the Portuguese CIT due on the gross amount of the foreign 
income, because literally that was the income that might be taxed in 
the source State. Circular-Letter no. 14825, of 19th March 1997, 
stated that the tax credit should be computed according to the 
ordinary imputation method, up to the tax liability calculated in 
accordance with the Portuguese CIT rules. However, ambiguity 
persisted, since it was not entirely clear whether the Circular-Letter 
meant the computation in accordance with the Portuguese CIT rules 
in respect of the particular item of income derived abroad or in 
respect of the total income derived by the taxpayer. 
Law 39-A/2005 contains no preamble and no preparatory 
works assist the interpreter in decoding the reasoning of the 
amendment.  In all likelihood, the introduction of an explicit 
reference to the Portuguese measure of taxable income had a merely 
interpretative nature. However, the law also repealed the possibility 
to carry forward (for five years) any excessive foreign tax credit, 
which may indicate a shift towards a less generous approach to the 
foreign tax credit mechanism.  
If one considered that previously the limit on foreign tax credit 
was computed on the gross income, the amendment to the law would 
be deemed to have operated a substantial change in the regime. This 
would imply a remarkable difference between the Commentary on 
Articles 23-A(2) and 23-B(1) and the interpretation, by the tax 
authorities of an OECD Member State, of almost identical language 
in its own law (the previous drafting of the provision). In the absence 
of any reservation to the Commentary by Portugal to that effect, and 
considering the lack of explanation for such a significant change of 
tax policy, the alternative of a substantial amendment is unlikely. 
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Nonetheless, one may wonder if Portuguese tax courts will accept 
that adding the expression “net of expenses directly or indirectly incurred 
to generate it” had merely clarification purposes. 
 In any case, and even considering the recent evolution of 
countries like Portugal and Spain, the refusal of a foreign tax credit 
exceeding the domestic tax due on the relevant net income derived 
abroad may not be universal and absolute yet. One may only 
conclude that it is highly likely that such refusal prevails and that the 
trend should be for it to be progressively adopted by more countries. 
Even if some countries allow their residents to carry forward or back 
unused foreign tax credits (or to claim them as an expense deduction), 
the principle remains that they are not willing to have their tax 
sovereignty encroached for the benefit of foreign countries. This is 
precisely the reason why the Commentary anticipates it as the most 
logical and expected position.  
 
c) How to apply the measure of taxable income  
 
i) General remarks on legislation in OECD countries 
 
Although the limit on foreign tax credit through the application 
of the domestic measure of taxable income prevails in what appears 
to be a large majority of countries, the mode of application of such 
limitation naturally varies between countries. It does not seem 
possible to discern a common denominator, even amongst the OECD 
members. A few examples may illustrate this point.  
In Belgium, no provision allows excess foreign tax credit to be 
carried forward, whereas in Italy Article 165(6) ITC allows it to be 
carried forward for eight years and in the US s904(c) IRC provides for 
not only a carry forward of ten years but also a carry back of one year. 
In Luxembourg, any excess is in principle treated as a deductible 
expense, whereas in Germany Article 34c(2) ITL allows taxpayers to 
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opt for such deduction instead of a tax credit (the UK also used to 
allow a deduction instead). 
With respect to interest income derived by financial institutions, 
differences are also significant. In France, for practical reasons, 
instead of allocating refinancing costs on an individual basis, banks 
may impute expenses to interest income derived by reference to the 
balance between interest income and interest expenses for all 
transactions carried out abroad, thus globalising the limit on foreign 
tax credit 79 . Additionally, certain overheads are excluded, thus 
maximising the amount of the credit available (§21 of the Statement 
of Practice no. 14B-1-76). In the US, s904(d) IRC clarifies that 
interest arising to banks does not qualify as passive income but 
instead as general category income (thus preventing the application of 
some additional restrictions on the amount of the credit). In the UK, 
however, s49 TIOPA caters for banks and related entities providing 
that “notional funding costs”80 prevail over the funding costs effectively 
incurred (unless these are higher), for purposes of computing the net 
income arising from a financing transaction.  
The list of differences is virtually endless. The above examples 
serve only the purpose of illustrating that, despite the trend (if not a 
consensus) within the OECD towards limiting the foreign tax credit 
by reference to the domestic measure of taxable income, the modes of 
applying such limit in practice are by no means uniform, as 
anticipated in the Commentary, and are constantly evolving. As an 
example, the Education Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act signed 
into law on 10th August 2010 amended the US rules on interest 
expense allocation for foreign tax credit purposes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 See Gouthière (2010), p. 693. 
80 I.e., “funding costs that the relevant bank would incur (on the basis of its average funding costs) in 
respect of the capital that would be needed to wholly fund the relevant transaction if that transaction 
were funded in that way”. 
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ii) Examples in case-law 
 
In light of the above, it is also not surprising that the courts have 
also been asked, in some countries, to rule on the modes of 
application of the measure of taxable income, as exemplified below. 
 
1. The German case no. IR 178 of 1994, of 9th April 1997 
 
In Germany, the issue of the measure of taxable income 
for foreign tax credit purposes was addressed in the Federal Tax 
Court case no. IR 178 of 1994 81 . Specifically, a German 
insurance company deriving dividends from several subsidiaries 
computed its foreign tax credit relief by reference to the gross 
amount of those dividends. The German tax authorities rejected 
such computation maintaining that the amount of the dividends 
should be net of the “economically attributable business expenditure” 
(including interest expense, certain provisions, trade tax and 
general administrative expenses). 
The Court agreed that the domestic measure of taxable 
income should prevail, i.e., that the cap of the foreign tax credit 
consisted in the German tax due on the net income, computed 
in accordance with German law. Specifically, the Court noted 
that income is “a general concept which embraces both receipts (net 
amount) and income (gross amount)”, thus refusing the idea that 
“the treaty meaning of income is to be understood as a net amount”82. 
However, noting that “the treaty law… allows the state of residence 
to regulate… those legal questions which arise in consequence on the 
amount of foreign tax credits for which credit may be given” 83 , it 
concluded that the threshold of the foreign tax credit consisted 
in the amount of German CIT due on the taxable income as 
computed under domestic law. 
                                                 
81 (1997) 1 OFLR 843. 
82 At 854. 
83 At 855. 
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On the other hand, the Court disagreed with the tax 
authorities on how such net income should be assessed. The 
computation should consider expenses effectively incurred for 
the purpose of generating the foreign income and not according 
to a pro-rata allocation of all expenses of the taxpayer, in the 
proportion between foreign and total income. Of all the 
expenses considered by the tax authorities, only a portion of the 
general administrative expenses had actually been incurred in 
generating the foreign income and should therefore be deducted.  
This position raises the question of whether, despite the 
apparently unrestricted leeway, one can discern in Article 23 
OECD Model some form of implicit limitation of the ability of 
residence States to compute the taxable income for foreign tax 
credit purposes. A purposive interpretation of Article 23 and 
Commentary appears to authorise the position that a DTC may 
prevent domestic rules from allocating unrelated expenses to 
foreign income for purposes of computing the threshold of the 
foreign tax credit. It is true that §§43 and 62 of the Commentary 
to Article 23 “leave[s] it free to each state to decide in its own 
municipal tax law what expenditure may be deducted from income” (at 
854-855). However, rules aimed at eliminating or mitigating 
double taxation on income would be deprived of meaning and 
consequence if income could be “manipulated”, going beyond 
the legitimate objective of the residence State protecting its 
domestic tax base and abusively deprive taxpayers of legitimate 
relief.  
 
2. The Commercial Union Assurance case 
 
In Commercial Union Assurance Company Plc v Shaw 
(CHRVF 98/0348) 84 , the UK Court of Appeal also had to 
analyse the form of computation of income for purposes of 
                                                 
84 1 ITLR 381, [1999] STC 109. 
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establishing the foreign tax credit cap.  The basic rule was that 
“The amount of the credit for foreign tax which under any 
arrangements is to be allowed against corporation tax in respect of any 
income or chargeable gain… shall not exceed the corporation tax 
attributable to the relevant income or gain” (s797(1) ICTA). 
The company, which had borrowed funds to meet the 
needs of both domestic and foreign businesses, allocated to the 
foreign income only the interest expense necessary to produce 
the amount of taxable profit appropriate to the full utilisation of 
the foreign tax credit. In brief, the company argued that, in 
accordance with s338(1) ICTA, “any charges on income paid by the 
company in the accounting period, so far as paid out of the company's 
profits brought into charge to corporation tax, shall be allowed as 
deductions against the total profits for the period as reduced by any 
other relief from tax, other than group relief”. In its opinion, foreign 
tax credit was an example of “any other relief from tax”, thus 
chronologically preceding the deduction of charges. In addition, 
it recalled that under s797(3)(a) ICTA “the company may for the 
purposes of this section allocate the deduction in such amounts and to 
such of its profits for that period as it thinks fit”. Accordingly, the 
company claimed that it could leave a portion of the expense 
aside (actually allocating it to small chargeable gains and thus 
available to be carried forward) and use the foreign tax credit in 
full (at the time, the law did not allow any excess foreign tax 
credit to be carried forward).  
The tax authorities argued, and the Court agreed, that 
s797(3)(a) ICTA could not be interpreted as allowing charges on 
income to be disregarded in this context, because the foreign tax 
credit was not a form of relief from tax which reduced the 
profits for purposes of s338(1) ICTA, but instead a credit against 
the UK tax payable. Therefore, expenses should be allocated to 
the foreign income before claiming foreign tax credit relief. In a 
certain way, the conclusion is aligned with the decision of the 
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German case no. IR 178 of 1994 in that expenses should be 
appropriately allocated to the foreign income, i.e., neither 
“excessively” (as the German authorities tried to do) nor 
“insufficiently”, as attempted by Commercial Assurance.  
Notwithstanding the above, it has been remarked that, by 
considering that the power to allocate charges applies only for 
the purposes of s797 ICTA (“determining the corporation tax 
attributable to the relevant income or gain”85), the decision does not 
clarify the purpose of s797(3) ICTA86. Such purpose may be an 
indirect way of maximising the amount of foreign tax credit, if it 
is concluded that the threshold is set as the taxpayer’s CIT rate 
on the foreign income. Specifically, an adequate allocation of 
charges could increase the CIT rate and thus the foreign tax 
credit. However, this conclusion would be more fitting if the 
measure of taxable income of the source country prevailed. 
 
3. The Dutch case no. BD6818, 07/4123, of 27th March 200887  
 
In the Netherlands, much debate and case-law preceded 
the currently settled position that foreign tax credit is computed 
by reference to the net income (at least for treaties entered into 
after 1980)88. The current debate focuses on the interpretation of 
the concept of “related costs” and the Lower Court of Haarlem 
had the chance of shedding additional light thereupon. 
Specifically, it upheld the taxpayer’s position in that the 
foreign exchange losses arising on the principal of a US$ loan 
made by a Dutch company to a related Brazilian company 
should not be allocated to the respective Brazilian-sourced 
interest income. The expression “related costs” encompassed 
only expenses incurred for purposes of generating the income, 
such as fees and interest paid on funds borrowed to be on-lent. 
                                                 
85At 395. 
86 See the Editor’s note, at 383. 
87 Available at http://jure.nl/bd6816 (accessed on 18th July 2010). 
88 See Specken/Peters (2009), p. 76. 
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Foreign exchange losses had not been incurred with that 
purpose (§§4.5-4.8) and should thus be disregarded.  
Since then, the Dutch rules have been amended with the 
purpose of expanding the concept of related costs, primarily to 
deal with avoidance techniques89.  
 
d) Brief remark on the exemption method 
 
As noted above, the exemption method does not provide 
substantially different answers to the problem of gross taxation at source. 
At first glance, one might be tempted to say that a difference might be that 
the solution reached, for instance, in the L&G case, allowing a taxpayer to 
have its tax liability on domestic income reduced by virtue of taxes paid 
abroad, could not be replicated in an exemption context. 
However, if the allocation of expenses is either ignored or not 
properly addressed, exempting foreign income may automatically imply 
that both direct expenses and the portion of general expenses and 
overheads attributable to such foreign income will effectively offset 
domestic taxable income, thus reducing the corresponding tax payable. 
This is precisely why the Commentary on Articles 23-A and 23-B states 
that “The amount of income to be exempted from tax by the State of residence is the 
amount which, but for the Convention, would be subjected to domestic income tax 
according to the domestic laws governing such tax. It may, therefore, differ from the 
amount of income subjected to tax by the State of source according to its domestic 
laws” (§39) and that “it is the gross income derived from the State of source less 
any allowable deductions (specified or proportional) connected with such income 
which is to be exempted” (§40). Assuming that this will be the stance of the 
majority of the countries adopting the exemption method, gross taxation 
remains to be solved here as well.  
 
                                                 
89 See Specken/Peters (2009), p. 78. 
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V. The response of taxpayers to gross taxation at source 
 
a) Introduction 
 
As concluded, neither the OECD Model nor the domestic laws of 
residence States provide an adequate response to gross taxation, since they 
focus entirely on double taxation. Therefore, in many cases gross taxation 
becomes “an absolute tax liability which increases the total worldwide tax bill 
rather than merely redistributing it”90, a charge that exceeds a reasonable tax 
on a profit margin, if not the entire margin itself91. 
 Therefore, gross taxation (particularly in the form of withholding tax) 
represents a major hindrance to cross-border investment, as noted in the 
1992 Ruding Committee report92, even leading to the temptation of setting 
up a PE to prevent it93. Some authors refer to withholding taxes as being 
“often levied on unprofitable activities, hence punishing or distorting cross-border 
trade and investment”94. Others, when referring to dividend withholding tax, 
allude to the “the usual problems of gross basis final taxes at source” particularly 
to the fact that “The foreign tax credit relief in the residence will not be effective if 
the shareholder… has deductions which reduce the income”95. It is therefore 
unavoidable that taxpayers themselves respond to gross taxation. 
 
b) Gross-up clauses 
 
In addition to renouncing transactions or engaging in “defensive tax 
planning”, gross-up clauses are the likely solution for non-resident 
taxpayers with sufficient leverage over resident counterparties, e.g. some 
financial institutions and suppliers of intellectual property 96 . The 
                                                 
90 Miller/Oats (2006), p. 162. 
91 See Holmes (2007), pp. 104 and 105. See also Baker (1998), p. 453, on the example of GCA, and 
Commentary on Article 11, §§7.1 ff. 
92 See Rohatgi (2005), p. 250. 
93 See Avery Jones et alia (2003), p. 242.  
94 Cockfield (2002), p. 617. 
95 Vann (2003), p. 49. 
96 See CFE Statement, p. 4. 
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Commentary is aware of this practice, stating that “creditors will, in practice, 
tend to shift to the debtor the burden of the tax levied by the State of source on the 
interest and therefore increase the rate of interest charged to the debtor, whose 
financial burden is then increased by an amount corresponding to the tax payable to 
the State of source” (Article 11, §7.1).  
Assuming that the payer has tax profits and that the grossed-up 
payment is fully deductible, gross-up clauses are likely to reduce the tax 
collected by the source State, since the increase in the tax levied on the 
non-resident should not offset the tax saved by the payer. In all likelihood, 
the CIT revenue lost on the grossing-up – e.g., 25% or more of 5.26, 11.11 
or 17.65 in the example below, with a base payment of 100 – would exceed 
the increase in tax collected from the non-resident – 0.26, 1.11 or 2.65.   
 
Non-resident      
reduced rates
Grossed-up       
payment Tax due
Net              
payment
5% 105.26 5.26 100.00
10% 111.11 11.11 100.00
15% 117.65 17.65 100.00  
 
However, with gross-up clauses not only the increase in the tax levied 
on the non-resident but instead the full tax payable by the latter becomes 
borne by the resident payer97. Accordingly, gross taxation emerges almost 
as a consumption tax driven by the ability to spend of the payer98, instead 
of an income tax based on the ability to pay of the recipient, which is 
currently the cornerstone of income taxation in the OECD and modern tax 
systems in general99.  
 
 
                                                 
97 See Vann (2009), p. 206. Tadmore (2007) argues that gross-up “is likely to be diminished significantly 
in a treaty context or where foreign tax credits are unilaterally available” (p. 15), but according to the 
author’s practice suppliers accept at best to share the tax credit, if and once confirmed. 
98 If unwilling to bear the grossed-up price, the payer will renounce the transaction. 
99 See Mooij/Stevens (2005), pp. 9 ff. See also Pinto (2007), p. 280, discussing the ability to pay and the 
distortion caused by gross taxation. Minimising the ability to pay in the international tax order, see Schön 
(2009), pp.72 ff.  
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VI. Conclusions and potential solutions 
 
a) Conclusions  
 
i) Gross taxation is more detrimental than double taxation 
 
Gross taxation is not an aggravated form of double taxation; it is 
an autonomous and more severe obstacle to cross-border income 
flows than double taxation. Even if the latter is entirely relieved by 
the residence State, gross taxation remains unaffected, unless the 
residence State waives some of the tax revenue attributable to other 
income, which a growing majority of countries seem unwilling to 
accept.  
Gross taxation may be the most significant income tax obstacle 
to cross-border transactions. Double (net) taxation is a significant 
hindrance, but does not necessarily render transactions loss-making, 
as may be the case of gross taxation. Transfer pricing (perhaps the 
most debated international tax issue throughout the 1990’s) has 
become more of a compliance nuisance than a substantial concern for 
multinational groups.  The allocation of profits to PEs (alive with the 
new Article 7 OECD Model and related Commentary to become 
official in September 2010100) is only relevant where PEs exist. Finally, 
issues such as triangular situations, conflicts of qualification or the 
treatment of tax-transparent entities, to list just a few, give rise to 
more intricate and sophisticated legal issues. However, they arise 
occasionally, whereas gross taxation is a constant of life. 
 
ii) Gross taxation is a paradox in the international tax framework  
 
Many countries address double taxation unilaterally. Therefore, 
although relevant, rate reductions and mechanisms for mitigating 
                                                 
100 See OECD (2010c). 
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double taxation in DTCs seldom go beyond “improving” domestic 
rules.  
Conversely, where gross taxation is involved, unilateral relief is 
almost nonexistent. Source States provide insufficient rate reductions 
and are unwilling to drop gross taxation. Residence States, already 
enduring the transfer of an excessive share of their residents’ profits 
to the source State101, usually refuse to “subsidise” the latter with a 
full credit, since that would incentivise gross taxation102. The foreign 
measure of income for computing the foreign tax credit limit is 
unlikely to gain favour 103 , despite compelling reasoning to that 
effect104, since its adoption would aggravate the disparity of efforts in 
the underlying “coordination game with a distributive conflict”105. 
Notwithstanding the absence of proper domestic relief, the 
OECD Model leaves the matter almost entirely in the hands of 
domestic law. The Commentary acknowledges that the reduced rates 
imposed on source States are very often not reduced enough and, at 
best, Article 23 may be construed as preventing the residence State 
from imputing unrelated expenses to foreign income when 
computing the foreign tax credit limit.  
Irrespective of the underlying justifications, this represents a 
paradox in the current international tax framework. Gross taxation 
can render transactions loss-making (even if a DTC applies), whereas 
such extreme result only occurs with double taxation if no relief is 
given in the residence State (for which domestic law is often enough). 
However, the efforts to remove income tax barriers to cross-border 
income flows focus on double taxation and neglect gross taxation. 
Where taxpayers most require protection is where the international 
tax framework has less to offer, leaving to “defensive tax planning” 
and gross-up clauses the solution, if any, to what is perhaps the most 
pressing international tax obstacle to cross-border transactions. 
                                                 
101 See Rixen (2008), p. 166. 
102 See Baker (1998), p. 445. 
103 A simple example of the likely reasoning of a residence State is provided in Inland Revenue (1999), 
pp. 21-22. 
104 See Baker (1998), pp. 453-454. 
105 Rixen (2008), p. 161. 
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b) Potential solutions 
 
i) Towards a net taxation system 
 
If the main purpose of a DTC is to prevent or mitigate double 
taxation106, it is not the appropriate instrument for addressing gross 
taxation. However, if its purpose is more broadly to remove or 
minimise barriers to cross-border transactions, while at the same time 
recognising the legitimate claim of source States to tax income arising 
from the access to their markets, it may accomplish such purpose by 
promoting a net taxation system107.  One may argue that if the rate in 
the source State were higher than in the residence State, net taxation 
should not be significantly different, as the residence State would still 
be unable to tax the foreign income. However, the impact for 
taxpayers would be considerable: irrespective of the tax rates at 
source, a pre-tax profitable transaction would remain a post-tax 
profitable transaction, often not the case today. 
Furthermore, in its First Report, Working Party 11 stated that 
“Avoidance of double taxation is no doubt achieved in the interest of the 
taxpayer and to promote good relations between States… but it entails 
sacrifices which must be equal if the measures taken are to be acceptable on 
both sides”. Where gross taxation is involved, the sacrifice of the 
source State is more apparent than real (since reduced rates on gross 
income frequently yield more revenue than standard rates on net 
income) and the residence State is unlikely to collect any of the tax 
revenue generated by the transaction. 
Certainly, the deduction of expenses of non-resident taxpayers 
is not simple and is potentially prone to abuse. However, to attach a 
higher degree of probability to that event if they are incurred by a 
non-resident taxpayer is unjustified where exchange of information is 
                                                 
106 In addition to preventing tax evasion, and perhaps double non-taxation (see Baker (2009), B.06-B.10, 
and the Introduction (§§2 and 3)). 
107 Among various instances, it was already considered by the OECD in the context of e-commerce (see 
OECD (2004a), §278). 
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effective, the more so if expenses are incurred in the source State. If 
they are incurred abroad, the source State may have to rely on the 
residence State to exercise some control over the taxpayer, but that is 
already the case today. Although a few countries accept statements 
from taxpayers themselves, most require from the tax authorities of 
the residence States the quintessential “condition precedent” for 
DTCs to apply, i.e., the certification of the taxpayer’s residence108.  
An alternative provision to the OECD Model in accordance 
with the net taxation principle has already been suggested (Article 17 
Commentary, §10) and the precedence of net over gross taxation is at 
the heart of another (Article 5 Commentary, §42.23) 109 . The 
combination of a refundable withholding tax with the option of filing 
a tax return for net basis assessment is adopted by some countries for 
types of income such as capital gains 110 , and has already been 
convincingly suggested in the context of e-commerce111. Increasing 
co-operation between tax authorities may extend it to cross-border 
transactions in general.  
In a word, net basis taxation is much more challenging to the 
capacity of tax authorities but, as correctly remarked, “countries that 
accept a UN services PE paragraph in their tax treaties may already have 
dealt with the gross-net complexity”112. The introduction of the alternative 
provision in Article 5 Commentary §42.23 OECD Model may 
indicate that the OECD Member-States are prepared. 
 
ii) The specific case of interest derived by financial institutions  
 
The impact of gross taxation on financial institutions is 
particularly severe. Apart from various references and suggestions of 
modified provisions (e.g., Commentary on Article 11, §7.7), the 
                                                 
108 A superfluous requirement if proper exchange of information is in place (see OECD (2009b), p. 5). 
109 See Russo (2008), p. 460. Pijl (2008) argues that the source State can tax gross income provided such 
tax does not exceed the tax assessed on a net basis (p. 473). 
110 See Vann (2003), p. 61, footnote 36. 
111 See Pinto (2002), pp. 207 ff., especially 210. 
112 Pijl (2008), p. 473.  
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OECD noted that “A financial institution is usually highly leveraged. As a 
result, a tax imposed on a gross basis will in many cases exceed not only the 
normal net income tax... but may actually exceed the amount of income 
earned with respect to the particular transaction”113. 
In this regard, it has been remarked that in the case of bank 
interest “both states accept that the income is business profits”114 and the 
OECD appears to share such view. The Commentary on Article 7 
states in respect of PEs of financial enterprises that “making and 
receiving advances is closely related to the ordinary business of such 
enterprises” (§49). It has also been noted that “business profits may be 
subject to tax on a gross basis in certain circumstances. This is true, for 
example, of interest received by banks and other financial institutions…Thus, 
the current rules… do not appear to be consistent with a conceptually sound 
measurement of business profits”115. Accordingly, and alternatively to net 
taxation116, gross taxation could in this case be addressed by treating 
interest derived by financial institutions as business income. Such 
outcome might be achieved either by amending Article 11 or by 
adopting a new, more purposive, interpretation of Article 7(7)117 : 
where items of income dealt with in other articles represented 
“business income” proper, Article 7(1) could not be overridden. This 
would be aligned with the practice of several countries, since “many 
States [unilaterally] provide that interest paid to financial institution such as 
a bank will be exempt from any tax at source” (Commentary on Article 11, 
§7.7).  
                                                 
113 OECD (2004a), §58. See also Article 12 Commentary §8 UN Model, and Schön (2010), pp. 92-94. 
114 Avery Jones (2003), p. 245. 
115 OECD (2004a), §58. 
116 As sustained in Arnold (2003), p. 492. 
117 Instead of removing it, as hypothesised in Avery Jones (2003), p. 246. Amending Article 11, defining 
business profits and deleting Article 7(7) are indicated as potential but unfeasible solutions in Arnold 
(2003), p. 490. 
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Either net taxation or taxation as business income would represent 
the “improvement” on domestic laws that the international tax framework 
paradoxically fails to provide. Time will tell whether some recent 
promising signs118  can bring us hope of making progress.  
                                                 
118 The extension of net taxation to passive income in Bulgaria (amendment to CIT Law published in the 
Official Gazette 95/09, of 1st December 2009) and the Czech Republic (Law 216/2009, of 17th June 2009, 
published in the Official Gazette on 20th July 2009), although applicable only to EU residents, shows that 
overcoming the gross taxation paradigm is possible.  
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